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Them  are many  experimental  studies  of bargaining  behavior,  but  surprisingly  enough 
nearly  no  attempt  hits  been  made  to  inrcstigate  the  so-called  ultimatum  bargaining 
behavior  expMner&Sy.  The  special  property  of ultimatum  bargaining  games is that 
on  every  stage  of’ the’ bargaining  process  only  one  player  has  to  decide  anti  that 
b&i  the IaH stage  the set of outcomes  is already  restricted  to  only  two  resuhs.  To 
make  the  ultimatum  aspect  obvious  we concentrated  on  situations  with  two  players 
a&  two stages, In  the ‘easy games’ a given amount  c has to be distributed  among  the 
two players,  whereas in  the ‘complicated  games’ the players  have to  allocate  a bundle 
of black  and  white  chips  witb  di&rent  values  for  both  players.  We  performed  two 
main  tqerimentir  for  easy  games  as  well  a3  for  complicated  games.  By  a  speci22 
experiment  it was investigated  how the demands  of subjects as player  t are related  to 
theit  aecqtance  decisions  as pbdyer 2. 
1.  IqFoiill&M 
.A  @me  in  strategic  or  extensive  form,  which  is  played  to  solve  a 
distri%utiu~  problem, is called a  bargaining game, Such a game has perfect 
infonmatisa  ii  all  &  inr’ormation sets  are  singletons,  i.e.,  there  are  no 
kr~ultaneous d&sions  and every player is always completely h:formed  about 
alI  the I previous  i-;lcx;isiorw.  Consider  a  batgaining  game  with  ptrfkct 
inlormation whose  plays a=  al  tite.  Such  s  game is called an ultimatum 
bar&ning  ,ganre  i&the last decision of every play is to choose  between two 
pred@crmined-resuk Oftea a game itself does not satisfy this definition, but 
%?nt$ins~srib~  for whioh this is true 
. I@  G!qt3mmm  lhq#nh&-,ow  LusuaUy speak3 of an ultimatum if one  *rty 
can 2e&rkt the-sat  of .$IOssibic.  qreemcnts  to  one  single prqosal  whkh  the 
&  pqt~Q GUI-.&t&r  843x3@,  or  re@cL  Since  in  an  ultimatum bargaining 
m  I@  s& of ~~ble~.outt;onxes  is  narrowed down  to  only  two  results 
b&JNFti  l&St  ck$lllim is :madk,  this %CFk&k3  our  terminolqy-  , .  .  ,  Ti”  3  ii  s  i‘ ,, _  ,:,,,:.  I  I  1  .  _ 
: w  ~~-~  l&.. qo ti&tk~ Rd&rcj  Seltpin  (univ~&ty  of BiehMd)  !md two 
~raErrrsl#‘f&  th&%aMAe  ad*. t.  ’  ’ 
tion.  Thus  it  is amcr~rnt c  which  was  to  be  distributed  among  the  two  subjects.  All 
mes  with  c43nlpkte  infoma~io  !I. 
‘IIke  nmkr  k  of  games ranged  from  9  to  12. So  the  chtinces to  meet  a 
EIS  player  2 were  rather  low  for  ali  players  1 
the  same  room  at  desks  which  were  far  enou 
e verbal  comrmmication.  Furthermore.,  players 
oppotdte  sides  of  the  room.  Each  pnrscicipant could  se?  all  :he 
d  had  a  complete:  control  thaf  the  expeiment  was  performed 
to  the  instruction  rules  in  the  appendix.  We  did  not  observe 
attempts  t,o exchange  messages during  the  experiments.  Be;wzetl  experiments 
cornmunicrxtion  was  not  restricted. 
2.2.  lib3y  gmnes 
fn  an  ea:Gy  gamt  the  two  subjects  were  first  determined  to  be  player  1 and 
player  2. The  subject  chosen  to  be player  I  then  dec!arss  \&ich  amount  a, 
he claims for  himself  The  difference  between  the  amount  c c >Q),  which  can 
be  distributed,  and al. is what  player  1 wants  to  leave  for  player  2. Given  the 
decision  of  player  1 player  2  has  to  decide  whether  he  accepts  player  l’s 
proposal  or  not.  If  2  accepts,  player  1  gets  a,  and  player  2  gets  c -aI. 
Otherwise  both  players get zero. 
Every  subject  in  the  subgroup  of  pIayers  I  got  a  form  (table  1) which 
informed  him  about  the  total  amount  c  to  be  distributed.  Player  1 ha 
write  down  the amount  of money  a,  which he demands  for himself. Then  the 
forms  were  collected  and distributed  by  I:hance to  the  subjects  in the  other 
subgroup.  Player  2 had  to indicate  whether  he accepts the pro,,  losal of player 
1 or  not.  Two  tickets  were attached  to  each  form,  one  for  player  1 and  one 
for  player  2. On  e,zch ticket  there  was a  capital  letter,  indicating  the  game, 
and  the  player  na~~nber.  So, for  instance.  Xi  is on  the  ticket  of  the  subject 
who  is  player  1 in  game  X.  We  called  XI  the  sign  of  this  subject.  The 
subjects had to show their  tickets  :to get their  payo&. 
Table  1 
The  form  given  to  wbjects  engaged  in easy  games. 
__ 
The  amount  c to  bc  distributed  is c=  DM .  .  . 
Player  1 can  dcmnnd *every  amov nt up ts c  = DM  .  .  . 
--_--------__-----___-__ 
sign  ofplayer  l:...l 
Decision of player  1: I &max~d DIM . . . 
-------.--_-------_--- 
Sign  of player  2:. .  .2 
I mccpt  player  l’s demmd:... 
I xtiwc  pieycr  l’s dunand:  .  ,  . 
~indicatc the dccisim  you  prcfw  by ao  ‘X?) 
m-p 2.3. Ckm&caed  games 
The experimenls  of complicate  mes Were j&ormed  in a  similar way. In 
a  compl&ated  game  player  .I first  to  divide  a  bundle  of  5 ‘&.~k and  9 
white  chip.  In  order  to  do  this  player  1  determines  a  vector  (m,, m2) 
indicating  the  decition  for  one  bundle  (1) with.  m,  (2; 5) blat?:  and  mt  ( 2<9) 
white  eltip  and  t!&  complen~entary  bundle  (II)  with  (5 -in,j  black  and 
(9 -RQ  white  chips.  After  the  decision  of  pfayer  5. player  2  has  lo  decide 
whether he wants to  have bundIe (I) or bundle  (II). The  other  bundle  is given 
to phxyer 1. flayer  f got  IMA 2 for each chip. Piayer  2 was paid  DM 2 for a 
Ma&  chip  az<ld  DM  t  for  a  white  chip.  Both  players  were  informed  abolut 
these VaLUs. 
The fo1.m  given to  ‘Se sufrJects engaged  in a comp,icated  game is shown in 
table  2.  .&&n  several  exarnp~es were  cafctiated  to  make  ore  that  every 
subject  completity  understood  the  rules  of  the  game.  Sotllg  subjects  had 
diEcul&  to  Ie~n  how  the  distribution  of  chips  detttrmincs  the  money 
Y& 
iln the ~xxn@cated game the. rational  d&tion  behavior  is not  so obtious. 
A  ratio&  pLayer 2  wal  alwz~~  choose  the  buindle which  YeIds  a  higher 
payoff for himi. For  player  1 it  is evident  thai  he has to deign  bundles  I and 
If  such  W.  rihe bundle,  which  @ayet  2  will  prefer,  conta&  as  few  wh;te 
Tilb 
TheBofxtlgiWItos~~  iJl compibtcd  games.. 
-I_-s--__  e_ 
!sigaQfplarcr I:...1 
toaxaelxtwr~ 
3  W 
9 white chip), or 
cm  tk  tlxnaiegdrip 
_-_.-_-._-___-c-__-__-_ 
‘sign arplayef fk:...z? 
IDccisicmof~yu2: 
!i~~sC~~~~af~&WsCaa~~... 
!I cbotJ8e  the  tm  nyQiipb@...  - 
bym’mj  ,. 
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chips  as  possible. Knowing  this some easy calcuJatlons  show  that  the  op;.imal 
dezision  of  pJayer  1  is  given  by  im,,  n1&==(5,0)  or  (0,9).  This  will  induce 
pliayer  2  to  choose  I  in  the  first  case  and  tJ  in  the  second  case.  The 
equihbrium  payoff  for  pJayer  1 h  DM  18, whereas  pla!rer  2  receives  Dh4  JO. 
ff  player  2  would  deviate,  he  WC  rid  get  DM  9  whereas  player  1 s payoff 
woulld  be  J>M  10, i,e., a deviation  of player  2 would  cost  player  1 much  more 
than  player  % himself. 
The  complicated  game  is  a  we&known  distributi(jn  procedure  [see,  for 
instance,  Kuhn  (1978),  Steinhaus  (1948)  Giith  (1979)],  often  zalle,j  ‘the 
method  of  divide  and  choose’.  In  the  economic  literature  it  is most’ry applied 
to  the  problem  of  cutting  cakes  fairly.  En cur  example  there  are  two  difTelent 
‘cakes’  and  two  individuals  with  dii’ferent  preferences. 
The  method  of divide  and  choose  yields  an  euvyfree  allocaltion  [Pawner  and 
ScJnnei.dler  (1974)]  which  is  even  Pareto-optimal  in  our  special  case.  In 
genera&  this  method  determines  ;rn  allocation  which  is  not  Parelro-efKcient 
[Giith  (1976)].  Observe  that  a  complicated  game  has  other  envyfree:  and 
Pareto-optimal  allocations  beside  the  t ?tt.ilibrium  ailocation.  If  pJaJ{er  2 
receives  the  bundle  (5,  I)  of  5 black  and  1 &Me  chips  and  ptayer  1 gets the 
residual  bundfe  (0. 8),  this  allocation  is  illso  envyfree  and  Pareto-ef,%-lettr. 
The  same  is  true  if  player  2  receives  thz  bundle  (5,2)  and  player  I  the 
rcsiduai  bundle  (0,7).  All  other  Pareto.-eff  cient  allocations  arp  rot  envyfree. 
Furthermore,  the  equilibr’um  payoff  of  playes  1 is his  maximal  pa.yol‘f an the 
set  of  envyfree  allocations.  This  demonstrates  that  the  method  of  I&&e  and 
choose  shows  player  I  to  exploit  the  preferences  of  player  2. Playrr  2 would 
prefer  to  be  the  one  who  determines  two  bundles  J  and  III betwLten  which 
player  1 has  tc  choose. 
3-  Experimental  resdts 
The  subjects  were  graduate  students  of  economics  (University  of  Cologne) 
attending  a  seminar  to  get  credit  for  the  final  exams.  J:  is  alLmost sure  that 
none  of  the  students  .cras familiar  with  game  theor;,.  Aft~.xr  pilot  studies  iu  the 
summer  semester  of  1978  the  main  experiments  wt;i’”  fszrformed  at  the 
beginning  of  the  next. winter  semester. 
For  the  -sake  of  completeness  we  also  show  the  results  of  the  pilot 
experiment  with easy games in  table  3. The  results  of  one  game, qxcified  by 
a capital  letter  in column  (i), appear  in one line. The  s<  cond  co’!umn of table 
3 gives the  amount  c to  be distributed.  Tht: third  one  the demanl;l of player 
1. A  ‘1’ h  the. fourth column  indicates  tSlal player  2 accepted,  w’lkerea(s  a  %’ 
says that  2 reXused  player  l’s proposal,  Conflict resulted in three (lqmcs  C, G 
and 11)  aif the nine games in table  3. 
J.E.B.O.-  D Naive  de&ion bel~avior in eesy  games. 
-I-  --m---^--- 
c  account 
to be  Demand of 
distributed  player  i  Decision  of 
Game  (DM)  tDw  player  2 
-_I-_  .---_ 
A  I0  6.00  1 
:  9  8  am  4.00  1  i 
D  4  2.00  1 
E  5  3.50  1 
Ei  6  3.00  ! 
7  1;: 
3‘_50  I 
5.00  1  10 
5.m  I 
s  9  5.60  1 
K  9  5.55  1 
L  8  4.35  1 
M  8  5.00  1 
N  7  mo  1 
0  7  5.155  I 
G  6  4.00  4.80  0  1 
it  :  5  2.50  3.00  1  1 
4  4.00  0 
4  4.00  1 
----w  --- 
Table  fi 
Fxpcrhmd  decision  behavior  in  ..asy games. 
---_-__l_  ----. 
c = amount 
to  be  Demand  of 
dimibutcd  pla: :‘r :  Ikision  of 
Game  fDM)  @Mj  player  2 
.--.-_a 
A  10  7.00  1 
B  10  7.50  1 
C  9  4.50  1 
D  9  6.00  1 
‘E  8  5.00  1 
f7  8  3.00  I 
G  7  4.00  1 
H  7  5.00  1 
:  4  4  3.00  0  0 
K  5  tz!  0 
I,  5  3:o0  1 
h4  6  5.00  0 
N  6  3.80  1 
0  IO  6.00  1 
p  9  f  4.00  4.50  6SO  0  1  1 
s  6  3.00  1 
T  5  4.00  0 
u  4  3.00  1 
-_-  - W. 4?W  e:?d.,  Ati  tsqwhentd  atudys  fs  of nltimafm  hrgainin,p  377 
rqgw&xi  as  the uosts of player  2 for choosi:lg  conflict. The  decision of player 
2 may  also depend  on the  share (cc-a&  elf player  2 according  to player  l’s 
‘propsaL  Qne  would  expect  that  player  3 is more  likely  to  refuse  a  given 
&man&of  player  1 if his pai  (c--al)  as wefl as his share (c - LFJC in case 
of wptance  bre comparatively  low. &idly:  one exceptional  case (piayer  R2 
in  table  5) *where the  rather  moderate  de’nand  aI =DM  4  was  refused  at 
costs  of DM  3 for player  2, it can  be seen j#ith the help of figs. I and  2 that 
the exnwr&nntai  results are in line with our intuitive  cxpc:tatioz.s. 
33.  Consistency of demands  in  easy  games 
After  testing  twice  the  behavior  in  easy  games  we  became  interested  to 
learn  how  the demand  behavior  of a subject, i.e., his decisions as player  1, is 
related  to  his  acceptance  behavior,  i.e., his  de&ions  as  player  2  [similar 
questions  for  other  game  situltions  are  analyzed  by  Stone  (1958)J  Would  a 
certain  subject  acccpt  as  player  2  an  ofler  to  distribute  c  which  he  would 
suggest  as  player  I?  In  order  to  investigate  this  question,  we performed  a 
third  experiment  of the easy game with c:= 7 DM in  the following way: Ah of 
the  37 subjects  participated  in the experiment  as pla!rer 1 as well as player  2. 
First  every  subject  had  to  decide  as player  I  which  amount  a,  he  demands 
Hz/C  0.6 I 
t”  I  1  1  1  1  11 
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.  ..‘I  ..,”  .,;  ”  ,)  __  Tablo 7  .A.  I.  :  1 
I :_;  CoPr(r*toncy.?fpPyoadCmsnda  inay  games* 
”  1  ‘,l‘*x  (2f :  ‘8,4e&md  s,hiem&.  ur +az =sum  Chsistcncy 
1  ,,’ :’  :~~‘.  ::sal@layc?  1  ~#w2  bp  dcmlands  of dem&s 
_-- 
‘6.00  (  ’  ia  7.00  0  ,-  ;,‘-‘,  / 
3.50  230  6.0  - 
3  3.50  ,  3.50  7.00  0 
3.50  7.00  0  ‘8 
4  :;g 
3.00  ?.OO  0 
6  3:50  7.06  0 
7  4.00  ;z  7.00  0 
’  8  3.50  8.50 
9  ’  i-ii  3.50  7.00  0’ 
‘,  ’  10  i50  3.50  7.00  0 
11  4  7.00  0 
I2  :z  tz 
13  ’  5:oo  Ii0  ;;  z 
.j~  14’  3.50  1.00  i50  _- 
15  3s  5.00 
8  16  4.w  2.50  ;:g  :’ 
17  -  4.00  3.00  7.00  0 
’  18,  4.00 ’  mcl  7.00  0 
19  5.00  1.00  6.w  __ 
20  0.01  7.00  0 
21  tz  5.50 
&IO  z  6.50  -- 
ii  4.00  3:50 _  7.50  + 
24  3.50  3.00  6.50 
5.013  2.00  7.00  0 
,ii  4&O  1.00  s.uI)  -’ 
. 27  I I  3.CG  2.00  5.50  -- 
25,  +#.OO  1.00  5.0 
29)  3.50  3.00  6.50 
30‘  3s  2.50  6.00 
31.  4.50  8.00  -1. 
qlo  Eii  0 
:5  4.00  610  ;z  -. 
34  3.50  7:00  I, 
:z 
ii  7:oo  Ei  G-:  7 
37  4.00  2:sa  &I  - 
-- 
‘.  ,I“ 
‘j,, I 
5  d&on  vtxtom  are  in  conflict  (+),  15  consistent  ([Cl)  and  17  in 
micmf%t  (-)  Thus  32.1  of ‘thi; 37  sub+  revealed a  nwimt  demand 
hehwi~r  in  tilwe  sense  that; ,&he  ,payoff  c-u1  was  not  smalkr  than  their 
stance  ley?! .a2 i)ss  pl&~  +  *Nearly  hal$ of the  37 veckws &,  a,)  were 
~wc;‘& a&k&&k  F  ‘j$&ct~  were a  to accept demkis  of player 
1 Iji$qK~.~gher  than tI#r  .Kti aspiratim kweis a,. 
’ ,Jg: r;;ric  +z+flkt  sub~;Wvw  lesv to My&  2 than t&y  themselves are 
w&!g  ~+FM?U!s  ph+G  “111’  y  /!h  must consider themseks  as exceptionally  _ 
/  (  \“/ coiumn  of  table  8. The  actual  choice  I  or  II  of player  2 is listed  in the  last 
column  irb  table  ‘8;  It can  be seen from  tabic  6 that  players  2 always chose; the 
bundle  which  yielded  a higher  r.:ayoff Hz.  In  the  pilot  study  of complicated 
games  only  one  player  1:  11=ziely subject  Il,  proposed  the  equilihri-J;n 
solution. 
The same subjects who participated  in the main experiments  of easy games 
were  afterwards  confronted  with  the  complicated  game.  The  results  of  the 
main experiments  with the complicated  game are Zisted in tables 9 and  1C;.  In 
a first test the payoffs  were the *same  as in the pilot  study.  The  -esults of this 
first  test  are  listed  in  table  9;  we  refer  to  thrum as  decision  behavior  in 
con;gGeated  games  with  low  payoffs.  After  3ne  week  the  experiment  was 
repated  with the rather  high payoffs  as determined  by the description  of the 
game. These  results  -  we refer to  them  as decision  behavior  in complicated 
games with high payoffs -  are listed in table  10. 
Compared  to  an  easy  game  situation  the  equilibrium  payoff  vector  (1X0 
DW,  1.00 DM) in table  9 or  (18 DM;  10 DM)  in table  10 is less extreme  in 
complicated  games  since  it  yields  comparatively  high  payoffs  for  both 
players.  There  are  two  possibilities  I =(ntl,  ne,) for  player  I  to  suggest  the 
rational  solution,  namely  (ml, mz)==/5,  0) and  (m,, m2)  = (0,9).  In  6 of  the  17 
games in  tabk  9 players  1 suggested  the  rational  solution,  whereas  in table 
10 this  was done  in  9 of  15 games. Thus  compared  to  our  results  for  easy 
games  players  .I in  complicated  games  rely  more  often  on  the  rational 
decision  behavior  although  it  is more  difficult  to  derive.  This  indicates  t‘nat 
Table  9 
ZtisiQn  behavior  in complic&d  games  with  low  payofps. 
_--  -..LI__.-_--- 
r&xisi0a 
I=(w?d  (H,(I);  H,(I))  (WIO;  fi,W))  Decision  of 
Gwne  of player  1  VW  PM)  plqer  2 
-  . .  __-.-c_-- 
A  (5>0)*  (l.%o;  1.00)  (1.00; 0.90)  1 
IZ. 
Ii.2  y;  (1.00; 0.90)  9: 
E  (1.40; 0.70)  I 
-!  . 
$1;;  (1%  1:10)  (l.f%;  0.80)  1 
yg  y$  I;.$  ;g;  II 
.L’F  (42)  .  I 
’  (J  *.  6-B  ’  (1:40: 1:20)  (1:40;  0.70)  I 
H.  ,(W  y$  :.t;  ykw;;;  I 
1,  .~  HP31 /’ 
621  .  11:4&  1:20)  (1:&: 0.7;)  : 
. &  (4+  ‘!  /  (L20;  1.20)  (l.ao;  0.79)  I 
I ., -L  :  L.  * . i  * ‘@s,Q) ,  (l.&W.Qti)  Poo;W  I 
>W  $4  3)  g4Qj  1.10)  w;g{  I 
N  ’  ‘(4,z)  1  ’ %  (l&q  1.00) 
(S3)  ~  (l;sosQ9q’  . [y&$  : 
,  ;‘k.  I  (5&f  ’ : , I&#@ MO)  .  I 
Q  v:  :+  .  WB  $R  s*ou1  >  _  .  <1:00;&)  5  I  , :  -‘A,’  --1___1 lif player  I  wa.;~ts as, zqt&  spht,  he  (;a~  propose  this  either  by  k  =(4,4)  0x 
BHre  ~~rres~~~d~~~  budk  11 or  by  F  = 4,  f j  and  the 
ff  player  2  accepts  it,  the  payoff  vector  is 
the  first  case  and  90) in  the  !Xcond  one. 
fcr  player  2  to  ac  split;  if  he  dek~afes  player  2  vdould  s&fer  a 
bile  player  1 wuuld  gain  by  such  a  devirrtisn.  I\  IS, of course,  better  to 
, yp2J  ==(I, 5)  or  the  corresponding  bundle  ;,;  J)  since  this  implies 
offs for  both  piaq2rs. 
9  ot1ly  c!ne  playrs  1 suggests m  equa’  split,  nameiy  the  one  with 
s in  table  10 three  players  ,  suggest  the  equal  split  with 
is  indicates  that  in  the  r~p~~i~d experi  2ent  there  is a  stronger 
;ii2  equal  split  3rd  that  not  alI  players  1 in  the  repeated 
experiment  were  fully  aware  of  the  payoff  structure.  At  leash for  these  players 
9  it  is  doubtFA  whether  they  have  analyscd  the  game  situation  earefuully 
enough. 
In  a  compfic-ated  game  player  1 chaos  a  maximin-strategy  if he designs  a 
bundle  H  = im ip  m*>  with  Vzll  + n22  ~ 7.  ue  to  the  special  structure  of 
aximin-strategy  by  player  1 determines 
and  DM  14 in  table  10). 
in  table  101  this  occurs 
nt  plajers  1 in  the  first 
eriment  of  complicateIS. 
games  more  players  1  tended  towards  the  normative  solution  while  more 
~~ay~r~ 2  were  ~~~~i~~ to  block  unbalanced  pay&  vectors.  This  behavior  sf 
players  2  has  2s  counterpart  in  a  stronger  tendency  of  some  experiericed 
egign  bundles  which  allow  more  balanced  payofl  vectors. 
ai~~g  games  are  special  bargaining  games  since 
i~t~ra~t~~~  of  players  occurs  only  in  the  form  of  ant:cipatisn.  In  order  to 
make  the  ultimatum  aspect  obvious.  we  concentrated  cm  the  easiest  non- 385 387 
about  pIdyer  l’s decision  (m,,m,J.  Knowing  player 
can  choose  between  the  bundle  (ml,m,)  of  ml 
the  residual  bundle  (5-mm,+mz)  with  S-m1 
s.  Player  t  receives  the  bundle  which  has  not 
‘I%  pay&  of oath  player  is determined  by  the  v,‘riu~  of all the  chips  which 
:x&&  If, for instanee,  player  2 chooses  the bundle  (m,,  m,),  his  payoff is 
m, - D&t  ii+  m;, IX++4  1. Player  2% payoff  is DIM 2 times the number  of chips 
which he receivc;d. 
(Rustration  lof  bargaining  rules 
experiment  will proceed  as follows: 
various  numerical  examples).  The 
Ther:  will be k=...  bargaining  games. First  it will be decided by chance who 
of you  will be players  1 and who of you  will be players  2 in the k bargaining 
games.  All  players  1  will  be  seated  at  the  (isolated)  desks  on  one  side, 
whereas  players  2 .wiIl be  seated  at  the  (isolated)  desks  on  the  other  side of 
the room. 
Each  player  1 will receive a decision form.  Every  player  1 has to determine  a 
bundle  I==(ml,m,)  of m,  black  and  mz  white chips. By this he u?ers  player  2 
to  choose  between  the  bundle  I =(ml,  mt)  and  the  residual  bundle  II = 
(5 -ml,  9-  m2)  of 5 -m,  black  and  9 -  m,  white chips. When de’  ermining  his 
decision  I=(mr,  mz),  player  1 does not  know  who of the  k =  . . .  l Iayers 2 will 
be his opponent. 
After  ail  players  1  have  made  their  decision,  their  decisio:l  forms  are 
distributed  by chance  among  the  k = . . . players  2. Knowing  the  two bundie>s 
I =(ml,  m2)  and  II = (5  -ml,  9  -mz)  each  player  2, has  to  decide  whether  he 
wants  the bundle  I =(ml,  m,)  or the bundle  II =(5 -ml,  9-m,). 
Each  player  has  15 minutes  for  his decision.  When  all decisia ns have  been 
made,  the  decision  forms  will be  collected.  As described  abov:  your  payoff 
will  be  determined  by  the  bundle  of  black  and  white  chips  which  you 
received. To  get your  money  you  have t 7 keep the tickei  which is attached  to 
your  decision form. 
If you  have  any questions,  we will be happy  to answer them now. During  the 
experiment  it is forbidden  to ask questions  or to make remarks. 
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